TIME: A SPEEDING TRAIN OR WIND-DRIVEN SAND?
THE ESTIMATION OF FIXED TEMPORAL INTERVALS AS RELATED TO IMAGES OF TIME

David J. Krus and Stephen H. Fletcher
Arizona State University

Summary.-Relationship between Knapp’s metaphor scale of attitudes toward time and subjective estimation of fixed time intervals, measured by a modification of Lovett Doust’s method was described. Results were discussed within the framework of studies relating the measurements of cognitive styles and altered consciousness states to the dilated or accelerated perceptions of time.

The interest in relationships between subjective perception of time and estimation of time intervals recurred intermittently during the last century (Vierordt, 1868; Meumann, 1893), and continued, unabated, to the present (Francois, 1928; Vojtechovsky, Krus, Grof, Vitek, Rysanek, Kunz, & Skala, 1968). Characteristically, situationally induced or experimentally altered mental states were shown to bear relationship to objectively measured estimates of fixed time intervals.

It seemed reasonable to assume that also naturally occurring mood states and individual differences with respect to habitual experiences of time flow could be reflected in objectively measured estimations of temporal intervals. To capture this time-related dimension of personality, Knapp’s (1960) technique of metaphor was used.

Instructions to subjects recommend adoption of a ‘poetical attitude’ and evaluation of the subjective appeal of a collection of metaphorical statements related to perception of time. As reported by Knapp (1960, p. 393), factorial structure of the time scale is bipolar. The dynamic pole is indexed by metaphors comparing time to such images as fleeing thief, a galloping horseman, or a speeding train. The passive pole is indexed by metaphors relating time to images like a quiet motionless ocean, a vast expanse of sky, and a road leading over a hill.

The topic, addressed by the present communication, is the question of the validity of the Knapp’s attitudes toward the time scale, i.e., whether the subjectively reported preference for either dynamic or passive images of time bear a relationship to objectively measured estimations of fixed time intervals.

Thirty two students enrolled in an introductory statistics class, participated in the experiment. The mean age was 27 years (SD = 5.7), 37% of subjects were men, 63% women. For the measurement of fixed time intervals, the modification of J.W. Lovett Doust’s (1955) method was used. The original estimation of a 15 seconds interval was extended to estimation of 5, 15, 30, and 60 seconds intervals and a maximal tempo of tapping was changed for a preferred one. The subjects were asked to tap with a pencil on a paper pad as fast as they preferred, to close their eyes, and were discouraged from mental counting. They were to report according to their opinion when the 5, 15, 30, and 60 seconds intervals had passed, estimations being made in a cumulative manner. One session was held for each subject. Discrepancies between reported and physical time were recorded by the experimenter.

For the measurement of subjective attitudes toward time, the Knapp scale of 25 metaphors was used (Knapp, 1960, p. 391) The subjective appeal of each metaphor was rated on a seven-point scale with number ‘7’ being assigned to the most preferred category and number ‘1’ to the least preferred. The scale were scored by summing the rating for active, dynamic images of time, and, separately, by summing the ratings for the passive images of time. The resulting score was obtained by subtracting the rated values for passive metaphors from the rated values of the dynamic time images. The mean of the obtained scores was 3.97 (SD = 1.96).

The scores on the Knapp’s scale of attitudes toward time were correlated with scores on the Lovett Doust’s test of estimation of four fixed time intervals. For the 5, 10, 15, and 30 seconds intervals, the obtained Pearson’s product moment coefficients were .58, .52, .54, and .68, all significant at the .01 level and accounting for about 34% of variance shared by both methods of time description under scrutiny.

The obtained results correspond with related findings of similar experiments, concerned with problems of time perception. On the physiological level, Sterzinger (1935) reported underestimation of time intervals after the application of quinine, overestimation after administration of theobromine, caffeine, and thyroxine. Vojtechovsky, Krus, Grof, Vitek, Rysanek, Kunz, & Skala (1968), using the Lovett Doust’s method, reported underestimation of time during the experimental psychoses induced by LSD and benactyzine. Horackova (1960), using the same method with a group of schizophrenics supports these findings: schizophrenics underestimate time.

On the psychological level, Gulliksen (1927) reported that pleasant psychic states result in underestimation, unpleasant in overestimation of time. Harton (1939) described the influence of success and failure on the estimation of time, and McClelland (1961) documented that subjects with high need for achievement overestimate, while subject with low need for achievement, underestimate time. Recently, Krus and Blackman (1980) reported changes in time orientation in subjects classified to Apollonian and Dionysian categories of styles of thought, as related to a diverse collection of categories of cognitive styles, as high and low absorption, trust proneness, and differences in prevalence of either affective or cognitive belief systems and peripheral-focal space awareness.

One possible explanation for these effects is an interesting hypothesis, proposed by Holubar (1960a, 1960b). He suggests that the inner, biological clock, measuring the time experience, is the brain’s alpha rhythm. In a series of electroencephalographic studies altering alpha rhythm by optical flicker stimulation, Holubar found changes in estimation of fixed time intervals, following the recorded changes in the frequency of brain waves.

The results, obtained from the present study, aside of asserting validity for the Knapp’s scale of attitudes toward time, also augment this diverse and varied body of knowledge about correlated of differences in time perception. The described results support the generally observed patter,. Subject with passive, ‘oceanic’ time imagery experience time as dilated while time perception of subject with active time imagery is accelerated.

These conclusions are supported by the comparisons of subjective estimates of time with their objectively measured physical time intervals and by a wealth of related studies of the sense of time, pervasive and ubiquitous determinant of manifold qualities of our experience.

REFERENCES

Doust, L.J.W. (1955) Studies on the physiology of awareness: Consciousness of the duration of time in psychiatric patients. Diseases of the Nervous System, 16, 363-365.

Francois, M. (1928) Contribution a l’etude du sens du temps. Annee psychologique, 28, 186-204.

Gulliksen, H. (1927) The influence of occupation upon perception of time. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 10, 52-59.

Harton, J.J. (1939) An investigation of the influence of success and failure on the estimation of time. Journal of General Psychology, 21, 51-62.

Holubar, J. (1960a) O casovem smyslu-tzv. biologickych hodinach. Vesmir, 39, 201-203.

Holubar, J. (1960b) The time sense and photic driving in man. Physiologia Bohemoslovenica, 9, 482-491.

Horackova, E. (1960) Odhad casu v experimentalni psychoze po LSD-25. Ceskoslovenska Psychiatrie, 56, 303-309.

Knapp, R.H. (1960) A study of the metaphor. Journal of Projective Techniques, 24, 389-395.

Krus, D.J., & Blackman, H.S. (1980) East-West dimensions of ideology measured by transtemporal cognitive matching. Psychological Reports, 47, 947-955.

McClelland, D.C. (1961) The achieving society. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.

Meumann, E. (1893) Beitrage zur Psychologie des Zeitsinn. Psychologische Studien, 8, 431-406.

Sterzinger, O. (1938) Neue chemopsychologishe Untersuchungen ueber den menschlichen Zeitsinn. Zeitschrift fuer Psychologie, 143, 391-406.

Vierordt, K. (1868) Der Zeitsinn nach Versuchen. Tubingen: H. Laupp.

Vojtechovsky, M., Krus, D.J., Grof, S., Vitek, V., Rysanek, K., Kunz, K., & Skala, J.  (1968) Experimental psychoses induced by benactyzine and LSD in alcoholics. Progress in Brain Research, 28, 86-105.

Accepted March 24, 1986.